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Abstract
This article builds on previous studies concerning the question of street-level bureaucracy,
an expression coined by Lipsky (1980) – Street-Level Bureaucracy. Dilemmas of the
Individual in Public Services (New York: Russel Sage Foundation) – to highlight the impor-
tance of the discretionary power that professionals in public agencies exercise during the
implementation of laws, standards and guidelines. Discretion may depend on the need to
compromise between the limited resources available and the claims of citizens, or between
administrative policy directives and assessments, on the one hand, and their interpretation
by “street-level” bureaucrats, on the other. This article focuses on the dilemmas that labour
inspectors face when dealing with employment irregularities involving domestic workers.
Based on nine months of observations in a local office of the Italian Labour Inspectorate, it
aims to understand how labour inspectors make use of their discretionary power when the
workplace is the home. This article connects studies of street-level bureaucracy with the
new institutional organisational analysis, focusing on the isomorphic pressures from
the institutional field in which the labour inspectors operate, together with the manner
in which such pressures shape labour inspectors’ discretion. Through this connection,
the article aims to extend the scope of both theories.




Inspector 2 tells me that discretion in their work does not exist. “If a colleague tells you
that they are free to behave as they want, then they are acting illegally, breaking a law, a
directive, a regulation. We are not free.” Inspector 12 tells him that he is being cynical.
“We are people first and foremost, and then labour inspectors. We are not robots. We
© Cambridge University Press 2019.
























































































































must reflect on the situation before acting, in order to do the right thing.” Inspector 2




This article refers to the series of studies of what has been termed street-level bureau-
cracy, an expression coined by Lipsky (1980) to highlight the importance of the dis-
cretionary power that professionals in public agencies exercise when implementing
standards and guidelines. Discretion may depend on the need to find compromises
between the limited resources available and the claims of citizens, or between admin-
istrative policy directives and the assessment of performance standards required of
street-level bureaucrats (Hupe 2013).
Labour inspectors, in this sense, are street-level bureaucrats. These civil servants
monitor, verify and judge any breaches in the workplace relating to the losses suffered
by workers. In pursuing this goal, they adapt the rules to specific cases, and interpret
laws according to the circumstances in which they operate. In this sense, they exercise
a substantial degree of discretion by adopting margins of autonomy when applying
directives dealing with various dilemmas (Raaphorst and Loyens 2018).
Inspectors’ discretionary power affects policy delivery and the rules or procedures
to be applied (Riccucci 2005). While acting, they deal with different types of dilemmas
regarding their interpretation of the applicable procedures, and ultimately establish
what is to be considered an emergency. Through their practices, they “help to create
and to maintain a normative order” (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, 23).
Dilemmas refer to all those situations in which values are in conflict (Cooper
2001), such as when fairness as perceived by street-level bureaucrats contrasts with
the correctness of the procedure (Kelly 1994; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003;
Epp 2009), or when legality and efficiency clash1 (Loyens 2016).
A typical dilemma for labour inspectors occurs when the home is the workplace, as
in the case of those jobs performed by domestic workers, a category of workers
considered vulnerable due to several factors, as will be specified. In this domain,
labour inspectors have to decide how tomanage work irregularities within that private
space, defined as “inviolable” by Article 14 of the Italian Constitution.
The power of access to workplaces is the most distinctive one attributed to
inspectors, as it grants them access at any time to any place of work. However, what
happens when the workplace is a private domicile, and as such a constitutionally
inviolable sphere of private life?
This article, based on a nine-month ethnographic analysis carried out at a local
office of the Italian Labour Inspectorate, aims to establish the manner in which
labour inspectors make use of their discretionary power when dealing with domestic
work irregularities. More specifically, it shall address the following questions:
(1) what happens to labour inspectors’ power of access when the workplace is a
private home; (2) how do labour inspectors manage their discretionary power in
1Street-level bureaucrats often have to deal with situations in which formal rules conflict with other values,
or in which formal procedures are considered a waste of time and inefficient.























































































































order to resolve this dilemma; (3) what institutional factors contribute towards
shaping their way of processing domestic workers’ complaints?
The authors intend to discuss these issues by considering street-level bureaucrats
not only as rational actors with individual preferences, but also as actors embedded
in a broader institutional field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) that shapes their use of
discretionary power (Garrow and Grusky 2012; Rice 2012; Epp et al. 2017).
This article intends to introduce neo-institutional organisational analysis to
research into street-level bureaucracy, in this way extending the scope of both theories.
From this perspective, on the one hand, it will be clear how institutional pressures
within an organisational field impact inspectors’ actions by reducing their discretion-
ary space; on the other hand, it will provide an insight into how aspects linked to
the professionalisation process, and the different ideas inspectors have developed
regarding domestic work irregularities, each entail a different operative logic.
Labour inspectors as street-level bureaucrats
Labour inspectors can be considered to be street-level bureaucrats (Fineman 1998).
Using Lipsky’s words, those who work within control and vigilance agencies, as
street-level bureaucrats, “decide who to sanction, determining the nature and quality
of the sanction” (Lipsky 1980, 13). In fact, labour inspectors have to implement
personal solutions when dealing with work irregularities, whereby they are called
on to decide whether, and in what way, to gain access to the workplace for inspection
purposes, and to find a solution that is to the worker’s benefit. Legislative, organisa-
tional and regulatory guidelines are not always formulated in a clear, unambiguous
way, and they are implemented through a process of adaptation, redefinition and
reinterpretation of the law on behalf of the actors (Saruis 2015).
Piore and Schrank (2006, 2008) try to assess the role of inspectors in ensuring
decent working conditions within two different institutional contexts – Latin
America and the United States – and investigate the relationship between business
practices and “decent work” standards. According to them, the “Latin model” is
more adaptable than the US one, because it gives inspectors greater discretionary
power. Latin labour inspectors are defined as an “assault troop” (Piore and
Schrank 2008, 20), and their job and goals are defined by practices embedded in
the culture of the inspectorate body and passed on from one generation to the next.
Other studies (Nielsen 2007; Loyens 2016) investigate the way in which personal
and contextual aspects may influence labour inspectors’ decisions regarding how
cases of forced labour can be resolved. These ethnographic studies show how the
perception of severity of certain situations determines priorities when searching for
solutions. This conclusion is reached by identifying different coping strategies. The
solution of a case is not solely motivated by the desire to obtain the right treatment
for the victim of labour abuse, but also by the need to achieve personal “outgrowth”
inasmuch as the number of arrests and resolved cases constitutes an indicator of the
quality of an inspector’s performance.
Although scholars generally agree that inspectors have considerable discretionary
power, there is no one definition of discretion (Hawkins 1984; Gilboy 1992; Kluin
2014). On a general level, discretion includes all aspects of an inspection process:























































































































when to visit, how carefully evidence is to be collected, how to interact with witnesses
and employers (Goosensen and Van der Voort 2009; Goosensen and Van Bueren
2011; Kluin 2014). However, there is a further discretionary power concerning the
penalty to be applied (Wiering 1999; May and Wood 2003; Lehmann Nielsen
2006). Davis (1969, 4) tries to provide a standard definition, arguing that “a public
officer has discretion wherever the effective limits of his power leave him free to make
a choice between possible courses of action and inaction”.
A substantial body of research distinguishes two main interpretative strands. The
first one sees discretion as the degree of freedom that the legislator grants to these
workers. Alternatively, the same term is used to define the way in which the granted
freedom is effectively used (Hupe et al. 2015).
Discretion leaves spaces open for the making of decisions. Street-level bureaucrats
use discretion mainly to give meaning to certain policy standards and to establish a
balance between the requests addressed to them and the resources actually available
(Lipsky 1980; Evans and Harris 2004; Hupe and Hill 2007; Brodkin and Marston
2013; Hupe and Buffat 2014).
Discretion can be defined as: (i) discretion within the framework of laws and
procedures; (ii) discretion among the laws and procedures to be applied; (iii) discre-
tion beyond the boundaries of laws and procedures.
Discretion is operated within the law because street-level bureaucrats adapt
norms to concrete situations. When the law is unclear and/or contradictory,
street-level bureaucrats interpret it by acting among the law. In the third case, when
discretion means acting beyond the confines of the law, it consists in a violation of
formal rules (Ham and Hill 1986; Kazepov and Barberis 2012).
This article focuses on the way in which inspectors implement their discretionary
power within a particular institutional field – that of paid domestic work – where the
private home constitutes the workplace. An organisational field is defined as “the set
of organisations which, taken together, constitute a recognised area of institutional
life” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 91). According to this definition, organisational
fields are constituted by actors who interact frequently and who establish socially
acceptable standards of actions. Organisational fields include companies, state
authorities, associations, unions, professional bodies, knowledge centres, mass
media and all those actors who, through their interaction, produce institutional
logics. Such logics derive from routinised actions that are institutionalised. They reg-
ulate actors’ activity by establishing criteria of legitimacy (Geertz 1982; DiMaggio
and Powell 1983), and ultimately establish the right way to act. The similarity
between the parts of the field is given by the effect of isomorphic pressures leading
to the adoption of standardised practices and procedures (DiMaggio and Powell
1983). Powell and DiMaggio identify three types of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic
and normative, which will be examined in the following paragraph.
Paid domestic work in Italy
The feminisation of migratory flows (Castles and Miller 1993; Bettio et al. 2006) has
made it increasingly common in Europe to employ migrant women in domestic,
care and cleaning activities (Anderson 2007). The carers, or badanti, are domestic























































































































workers assisting elderly and disabled people. With the term “cleaner” we refer to
those domestic workers involved in cleaning other people’s homes (Andall 2000).
These working activities are also considered at risk of irregularities and exploitation
(FRA 2015), and are part of what Piore (2011) defines as the secondary labour market,
consisting of precarious, poorly paid and socially penalising jobs (Ambrosini 2005).
The lack of knowledge of the local language, the need to have a job in order to
obtain and maintain a valid residence permit, and in some cases the non-recognition
of their qualifications make immigrants vulnerable workers. In Italy, according to
INPS data,2 the composition by gender of this category shows a growing prevalence
of female domestic workers (Table 1).3
In 2017, women employed in the domestic sector constituted 88.3% of the total
workforce (763,257 in absolute figures) and were of predominantly Eastern
European origin (43.7% of the total).
Domestic workers are considered to constitute a vulnerable category, not only for
being mostly foreign and female, but also as a consequence of the places where they
work. A recent research conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental
Rights (FRA 2015) showed how their isolation makes these workers more exposed to
the risk of being exploited and being subjected to irregular working conditions.
Within the domestic sphere, employment contracts are often absent or not complied
with. In Italy, Law 339 was adopted in 1958 to establish a system of domestic labour
regulation, and it is considered the first step towards the specific recognition of care
work, which perpetually straddles the formal and informal divide, and up until 2007
was without any national collective agreement, unlike other areas of employment in
Italy (Sarti 2010). The aforesaid Law established: eight occupational levels, based on a
worker’s qualifications; working hours standards4; resting requirements and the
possibility of changing shifts.
Although the goal of these measures was to extend domestic workers’ social
protection, there is still a gap between domestic work and other areas of employment.
Table 1. Domestic workers in Italy by year and gender
Year
Gender
Total %Male % Female %
2012 191,300 18.9 821,688 81.1 100
2013 159.401 16.6 801,612 83.4 100
2014 121,210 13.3 790,289 86.7 100
2015 110,909 12.4 785,293 87.6 100
2016 104,644 12.0 768,606 88.0 100
2017 101,269 11.7 763,257 88.3 100
Source: INPS, observatory on domestic workers: figures processed by the authors.
2Data have been collected by the observatory INPS on domestic workers: https://www.inps.it/
webidentity/banchedatistatistiche/menu/domestici/main.html
3The statistical unit is represented by the domestic worker who has received at least one contributory
payment during the last year.
4Working hours were set at 40 hours a week for workers who do not live in the place where they work,
and at 54 hours a week for live-in workers.























































































































Furthermore, the high degree of informality that characterises both the workplace and
working relationships leads many employers (families) not to apply the recently intro-
duced national collective agreement. This means that a large part of domestic work is
not declared for tax and social insurance purposes (Sarti 2010).
Data collection and fieldwork: the institutional context
Data were collected through the adoption of an ethnographic method permitting
continued observation and consisting in the drafting of field notes (Fassin 2013).
During the observation period, the analysis focused on labour inspectors’ ways
of dealing with domestic work irregularities. Observations were recorded inside a
local office of the Italian Labour Inspectorate, for a period of nine months starting
from February 2017.5
The data collected by means of participant observation were transcribed from the
field notes taken.
During the participant observation period, 41 cases of interaction between labour
inspectors and domestic workers were observed. Thirty-two of these cases involved
labour inspectors and carers, while nine involved labour inspectors and cleaners. All
domestic workers complain of employment irregularities.
Twenty-eight cases of interaction were observed during dispute settlement proce-
dures before the inspection. This consists of a specific procedure provided for by
Italian law to settle wage-related and insurance contribution-related employment
disputes. Twelve cases were observed at a complaints desk, where workers submit
complaints regarding their irregular employment situation (Table 2).
Observing labour inspectors’ decisionmaking from their perspective offers the
opportunity to focus on ordinary events in natural settings and to learn about
the inspectors’ strategies and motivations. Ethnography, furthermore, permits an
analysis of discourse6 both during formal interaction and conducted in informal
settings, thus bringing out the relational dynamics concerned.
Table 2. Observed interaction between labour inspectors and domestic workers, and
the discretionary spaces concerned
Types of worker
Discretionary spaces
Investigative phase TotalComplaints desk
Dispute settlement
facility room
Carer 9 22 1 32
Cleaner 3 6 0 9
Total 12 28 1 41
Source: Authors’ field notes.
5Observations were conducted within the framework of a broader ongoing research project. For the pur-
poses of this article, only cases of interaction between labour inspectors and domestic workers have been
analysed.
6Discourse analysis is defined as the analysis of language beyond the sentence. The main goal is to study
the content of speech in order to understand how it affects the meaning of the sentence.























































































































Labour inspectors were observed in three “discretionary spaces”: (1) the complaints
desk, (2) settlement proceedings before a single judge,7 (3) office work during the
investigative phase. The complaints desk comes into play when a worker complains
about his/her irregular employment situation. In such cases, the labour inspector
may decide to proceed with an investigation, or look for an administrative solution
(by means of the dispute settlement facility), or not open the case at all. The dispute
settlement facility represents a specific procedure provided for by Italian law no.
124/2004 and is designed for the purpose of settling wage-related and insurance
contribution-related employment disputes. If no agreement is reached between the
worker and employer, then an inspection has to be carried out. In such cases, the labour
inspector is an impartial third party who, on the basis of workers’ statements submitted
to him/her, aims to find an administrative solution that suits both parties. If the dispute
is settled at this stage, the employer will not be subject to any penalty. Labour inspectors
use their discretionary powers to encourage the parties to come to a financial agreement,
or to discourage domestic workers from accepting the conciliatory procedure. During
the investigative phase, the labour inspectors may decide how to collect information on
the case, and whether to proceed with a workplace inspection or not.
What happens, however, when the workplace is the home? Are labour inspectors
to interpret the home as an “inviolable” private sphere in accordance with Article 14
of the Italian Constitution?
Which institutional factors shape labour inspectors’ decisionmaking?
Dilemmas arise mainly as a result of the fact that labour inspectors cannot always
launch an investigation in every single case: time, resources and staff are not sufficient
to be able to deal with all complaints received. Furthermore, not all cases can be dealt
with through a reconciliation procedure: first of all, because the success of the dispute
settlement facility depends on the existence of an agreement between parties involved,
and in the absence of such an agreement a mandatory investigation should be
launched; secondly, not all disputes can be resolved through a financial transaction.
Indeed, according to Article 2112 of the Italian Civil Code, a violation of human rights
such as the refusal to grant workers a certain number of hours of rest each day, or the
failure to pay a minimum wage, cannot be settled by the offer of financial compen-
sation. However, the dispute settlement facility is often the preferred method of
resolving these violations.
Finally, the labour inspectors’ operations have to comply with the standards
established by the central authority.
Based on a multi-level approach, this analysis examines street-level bureaucrats’
discretionary actions as influenced by the institutional logic of the organisational field
in which they operate (Garrow and Grusky 2012; Rice 2012; Thornton and Ocasio
2017). As mentioned before, an organisational field includes all those actors (institu-
tional and non-institutional) whose role it is to establish socially acceptable standards
of action (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). To deal with the dilemma at the centre of this
article, labour inspectors make their decisions within the organisational field of
domestic workplace controls. There are many different actors operating within this
7In Italian, this procedure is called “conciliazione monocratica”. During this procedure the labour inspector
is an impartial third party tasked with finding an administrative solution to the dispute between the worker
and employer. This procedure precedes inspections, and enables several cases to be resolved in a short time.























































































































organisational field. The state, through the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies,
establishes national guidelines in the field of labour protection which define priorities
in terms of actions and controls. Institutional actors operating within the field also
include control agencies and inspection bodies, such as the National Labour
Inspectorate, the National Social Insurance Institute (INPS), the National Institute
for Insurance against Accidents at Work (INAIL), and the Carabinieri’s
Employment Unit. The field also comprises labour inspectors, domestic workers,
employers, trade unions, journalists and the public.
The organisational field of domestic workplace control is characterised by a move
towards the establishment of standardised operational procedures and systems of
accountability that are the result of organisational change aimed at replacing
“the alleged inefficiency of hierarchical bureaucracy with the alleged efficiency of
the markets” (Power 1997, 61). The concept that best captures the process of
homogenisation is isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Thus, the “manage-
rialisation” of domestic workplace control establishes isomorphic pressures that lead
to the adoption of standardised practices and procedures based on evaluation,
control and performance criteria (Borghi and Rizza 2006).
These isomorphic pressures generate a change that leads the members of an
organisational field to adhere to the established institutional logic. Powell and
DiMaggio identify three types of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative.
In the first case, the members of an organisational field are subjected to external
pressures (e.g. legal constraints) that force them to conform, and these stem from
the problem of legitimacy. When isomorphism is mimetic, situations of uncertainty
are dealt with by imitating the identified solutions. Isomorphism is normative when
professions define their respective working conditions and methods and establish
the cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy: in this case,
changing practices are not generated by uncertainty, but by an awareness of their
alleged superiority (Bonazzi 2002).
Nevertheless, street-level bureaucrats continue to use their discretionary power of
agency and to filter the influence exerted by the organisational field (Garrow and
Grusky 2012). The present analysis tries to unveil the interplay between institutional
pressures, on the one hand, and the discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats,
on the other.
Principal findings: isomorphic pressures and domestic work irregularities
In 29 of the 41 observed cases of interaction, the home was interpreted as a private
place and, for this reason, was deemed inviolable. Furthermore, labour inspectors
who see the home as a workplace have not always decided to process the case
through an inspection.
The aforementioned dispute settlement procedure is provided for by Italian
Legislative Decree no. 124/2004, and is designed to provide an administrative solution
to cases of employment irregularity, mainly consisting of wage- and social insurance-
related employment issues reported by workers. This facility precedes an inspection
by the Labour Inspectorate, which will only be launched if no agreement is reached
between the workers and employers. The labour inspector plays an impartial role,























































































































acting on the basis of employees’ statements in an attempt to find an administrative
solution that suits both parties as far as possible. By resolving the dispute at this stage,
an employer will avoid any consequent penalty.
In the field of domestic work irregularities, this solution is considered by most
labour inspectors as “the only glimmer of hope for these women” (field note)
whereby they may obtain some form of financial reimbursement at least. The deci-
sion to refer domestic work irregularities to the dispute settlement facility is the result
of institutional pressure, from national and local offices, to comply with procedures
in keeping with the new organisational logic imposed by the new public management
approach to public administration (Ferrari 2002). This may be interpreted as coer-
cive isomorphic pressure exercised by central government, forcing inspectors to con-
form to defined standards (Borghi and Van Berkel 2007) based on accountability
criteria and measurable performance standards.
The spread of this procedure is also demonstrated by the data: at the local office
analysed here, cases of irregularities within the domestic sector for which the investi-
gative procedure was launched numbered 47 in 2015, but only 1 in 2016, the year in
which the conciliation procedure was introduced.8 Since then, conciliation has been
obligatory in the case of domestic workers reporting employment irregularities to the
complaints desk, regardless of the type of irregularity, thus reducing the risk of legal
disputes arising regarding the interpretation of home as inviolable and private, or as a
workplace.
Although Article 2113 of the Italian Civil Code states that the violation of work-
ers’ rights9 should not be remedied by a mere economic transaction (as would be
the case with the conciliation procedure), this solution has become a standardised,
substantially legitimised procedure.
I ask him if he thinks that the dispute settlement procedure is a fair solution.
“I think that this allows us to speed up proceedings and close many cases.”
Inspector 7, M
Field Note, 07/2017
“We cannot help everyone. When dealing with domestic work, the risk is that of launch-
ing an investigation leading to a dead end. These are difficult cases. How do you get
access to people’s homes? Not everyone lets you in”.
Inspector 1, M
Field Note, 02/2017
In addition to coercive isomorphic pressure, the institutional field is also increas-
ingly characterised by what has been called normative isomorphism. However, in
this case inspectors use their discretionary power differently. Normative isomorphic
pressures stem from the harmonisation of competencies and an ever-increasing
degree of professionalisation. With this in mind, membership strategies have been
8Data from each local office of the National Labour Inspectorate can be found at: https://www.ispettorato.
gov.it/it-it/studiestatistiche.
9These include the right to freedom, daily rest, holidays and minimum wages.























































































































developed that delineate the exclusion boundary and delimitate the field of action.
However, having taken different paths towards professionalisation, labour inspec-
tors tend to adopt different approaches. Indeed, the ethnographical study highlights
two different approaches to inspections when the home constitutes the workplace.
More experienced inspectors tend to see the protection of workers’ rights as their
main duty. Despite organisational field pressures encouraging recourse to the dis-
pute settlement facility, inspectors with greater professional experience disagree
with this method.
The worker, fromUkraine, is a live-in caregiver, despite her part-time contract. She shows
us photos of a bare room where she has been sleeping for a year and a half. ( : : : ) When I
was alone with Inspector 3, he told me that he doesn’t want to bring this case before the
labour inspection for conciliation, but wants to carry out an inspection. “I’ve been
doing this job for 20 years. Things change, I know it. I should push for conciliation
so we can speed things up, but I disagree. I would go to the house of that person (referring
to the employer) without even asking permission. Her house is a place of work.”
Inspector 3, M
Field Note, 09/2017
Experienced inspectors often refer to the number of cases they have dealt with
during their long careers.
“I have been doing this job for 19 years. 19 years is a lot. And frankly, I don’t like the




Inspector 17 is drinking her coffee and is disappointed. She tells me that sometimes she
is not sure about the sense of her job. “Can you imagine it? From 1996 to 2004, we did
eight inspections every day. Everything was simple. Procedures were simple. Now there
is a lot of bureaucracy and many organizational problems. I cannot waste my time. Is
the home a private place? Is it a workplace? It’s a waste of time. Is she (referring to a
domestic worker) working there? Okay, in this case we have to make an inspection”.
Inspector 17, F
Field Note, 09/2017
The younger inspectors, unlike the older ones, must hold a university degree. They
are trained to consider the efficiency of their operations as their main goal. A labour
inspector is considered efficient if he/she can solve as many cases as possible.
Accountability criteria and the measurement of performance are the primary objec-
tives for the purposes of the achievement of quantified standards. This is reflected in
their way of working, which leads them to prefer the dispute settlement procedure.
When they (domestic workers) come to complain about their situation : : : well : : : it is
always easy, because you don’t have to think about it too much ( : : : ) you do not have























































































































much of a choice. The home is not a normal place of work, and so if you want to help
them you should refer their cases for dispute settlement by means of conciliation. But if
conciliation doesn’t work, then that’s a problem.
Inspector 7, M
Field Note, 05/2017
Inspector 12, talking about the accountability practices adopted in the local office and
about the new practices introduced to speed up procedures, tells me that he is very
happy and mentions the difference between “junior” and “senior” inspectors. “They
(senior inspectors) feel restricted by all these performance standards. I believe, on
the contrary, that they are necessary in order to communicate what we do, not only




Mimetic pressures operate to reduce uncertainty about the outcome of inspections,
by encouraging the adoption of standardised strategies (Flood and Fennell 1995). As
a result, there is a trend towards managing employment irregularities in the domes-
tic sector through recourse to the conciliation procedure. Faced with the uncertain
outcome of inspections, domestic workers who appeal to the complaints desk are
encouraged by inspectors to follow the route of conciliation. This procedure repre-
sents the fastest way of solving such cases, although for the worker it means giving
up those rights that could not be compensated by money. This trend is also affected
by the strong degree of racialisation of the domestic sector, as has been pointed out
by a substantial body of research carried out in Italy. The existence of stereotypes of
domestic workers can influence the way in which some inspectors manage employ-
ment irregularities (Catanzaro and Colombo 2009; Fullin and Vercelloni 2009). This
is an external pressure that has been absorbed by the organisation, becoming a rou-
tine justifying labour inspectors’ working practices. For example, the belief that
Romanian workers are “cunning” and “calculating” limits the quality of interaction
between labour inspectors and such workers, and reduces the time spent on such
cases and the inspectors’ willingness to explain to Romanian domestic workers all
the possible options available to them. These beliefs compromise the commitment
of inspectors, who consequently choose the quickest, least demanding solution, thus
reducing the likelihood of lengthy procedures and the uncertain outcome of any
inspections.
Inspector 2 interacts using technical language. The worker, a Romanian, is screaming:
“I do not understand, you speak in a difficult way. I would like to say why I am here.
Because this woman (she means the employer) treats me as a servant! She hasn’t paid
me for months!”
Inspector 2 looks at her for the first time: “I speak in this way because the law speaks in
this way. If you don’t understand, you cannot get anything (he means money).”
Inspector 2, M
Field Note, 03/2017























































































































It is the third reconciliation procedure in two days involving a domestic worker from
Romania. She is a carer. Inspector 13 proceeds as always: he gets the parties to sit down
and then gives them the standard information, lets them talk to each other for a while,
and then (after no more than ten minutes) draws up the report, copying and pasting the
same case from two hours before. When he finishes, he looks at me: “At least in this way
(he means via the conciliation procedure) they work things out themselves.”
Inspector 13, M
Field Note, 04/2017
During the dispute settlement procedure, the domestic worker accused the employer of
having been treated for two and a half years as a slave. And she shows the labour inspec-
tor a photo of a mattress lying on the floor, where she was forced to sleep. The inspector
does not look at the photo, because this is not the right place to show evidence. He then
suggests to the domestic worker that it is better to accept the financial agreement, to
have some money as soon as possible.
Inspector 6, F
Field Note, 04/2017
“Who tells us that they (he means the domestic workers) did not understand that dur-
ing the dispute settlement procedure they could get some money and come here to com-
plain exaggerating their situation?”
Inspector 7, M
Field Note, 05/2017
“What do they mean by ‘working time’? If you’re at home smoking cigarettes, you’re not
working.” They laugh over their coffee.
Inspector 6, F; Inspector 15, M
Field Note, 04/2017
A different approach that counters the aforementioned mimetic pressures is
adopted by those inspectors who are, or who have been, employers of domestic
workers themselves.
I’m a bit sorry for that lady. She reminds me of my Mum’s carer, who has become part
of my family. I should have insisted so she could have got more.
Inspector 4, F
Field Note, 04/2017
Drinking a coffee, he asks me if my grandparents have a caregiver. I answer no. And he
tells me that it is difficult for me to understand how serious it is to treat those caring for
your elderly relatives badly.
Inspector 12, M
Field Note, 06/2017
The field notes above show how direct experience of domestic workers leads inspec-
tors to perceive these irregularities as more serious, and to being more empathic
towards this type of worker.
























































































































This article explores how labour inspectors use their discretionary power when deal-
ing with employment irregularities in cases where a private home constitutes the
workplace. Field notes collected over nine months of participant observation have
been analysed. Our findings highlight the fact that the discretionary powers that
labour inspectors exercise as frontline workers (Lipsky1980; Caswell et al. 2017)
is affected by the institutional pressures embedded in the organisational field of
workplace control. We have identified three forms of isomorphic pressure that
induce inspectors into adopting solutions whereby reported employment irregular-
ities are referred to the conciliation facility provided by the Labour Inspectorate.
These three forms of pressure are: coercive, normative and mimetic. We have also
highlighted how such pressures do not eliminate the discretionary spaces within
which actors may make their decisions. We illustrate the different courses of action
adopted by inspectors in addressing cases of employment irregularity. When nor-
mative isomorphism prevails, for example, most inspectors tend to refer these cases
to the Labour Inspectorate’s conciliation facility, in order to resolve disputes as
quickly as possible. However, other inspectors – albeit a small minority – adopt
a different attitude, and by appealing to the criteria of justice and the restoration
of workers’ rights, they believe that employment irregularities in the domestic
sphere must be further investigated. Accordingly, normative isomorphism and
the reactions of labour inspectors are the result of the interplay of different profes-
sionalisation paths. In the case of mimetic isomorphism, the conciliation option is
pursued by labour inspectors – a majority – who have interiorised stereotypes of
domestic workers influenced by the strong racialisation of this particular sector
of the labour market. This trend results in institutional pressure for the adoption
of the fastest solution, since the outcome of any inspection is invariably uncertain.
The devaluation of domestic work, most of which is done by immigrant women,
inhibits further investigation. Nevertheless, other inspectors who themselves
employ, or have employed, domestic workers react differently to such institutional
pressure, and perceive these irregularities as more serious; consequently, they
believe that the conciliation procedure is not enough. By further examining these
issues, this article reveals the contribution of the new institutional perspective to
the street-level bureaucracy approach. First of all, it enables the complexity under-
lying caseworker–client interaction to be considered, thus responding to certain
critics who see the street-level bureaucracy approach as “context-free” (Berman
1978, 32). Furthermore, the combination of these two frameworks significantly con-
tributes towards our understanding of the implementation of directives and regu-
lations within different institutional fields.
Our research findings generate a number of other questions, and thus further
research is required in order to examine frontline workers’ discretion within other
areas of the labour market than the one analysed here. Moreover, in an attempt to
develop the comparative analysis of street-level bureaucracy (Hupe et al. 2015),
labour inspectors’ discretionary powers in different countries and institutional set-
tings could be examined in depth. Unanswered questions emerge from our research:
is the standardisation of the organisational practices followed in dealing with
employment irregularities a way of protecting highly discriminated workers, or does























































































































it result in a deterioration in the quality of those actions taken? How, and to what
degree, does single-judge reconciliation mean a loss of rights, also when comparing
domestic to non-domestic work? What are the consequences of this type of deci-
sion? Furthermore, can the number of cases that have been solved through the
single-judge reconciliation procedure, compared to the number of cases solved sub-
sequent to inspections, be quantified?
Acknowledgements. None.
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